摘要：This paper posits an interpretivist approach to the study of human resource management (HRM) by examining how organizational members construct meanings of HRM in everyday life through ritualistic behavior and the use of language. Concepts from language philosophy and socio-anthropology are brought together to develop an analytical premise upon which we can begin to appreciate the seemingly complex issues associated with expressive and ritualistic behavior in organizations. Propositions are posited and subsequently examined through an analysis of statements about teamwork in a Kenyan firm. A thematic analysis reveals that teamwork is a totemic device created by organizational members in everyday life. Through shifts in language games ranging from rhetoric to plain speaking, management uses the totem of teamwork to create and legitimize the desired pattern of power and social relations.
摘要：Pit sense is a form of knowledge constituted by tunnellers as a way to navigate and assess risk. We discuss how this form of tacit knowledge that was situated in everyday practices came under threat when management introduced more bureaucratic procedures rationalized on the basis of commercial outcomes and health and safety. Yet, while managers were prone to vilify pit sense even though they had grown up with it earlier in their career, they were prepared to turn a blind eye to it as long as it delivered 『yardage』. We examine the implications of this managerial ambivalence towards pit sense, and demonstrate how, rather than seeking to codify tacit knowledge in order to ensure its diffusion as the literature proposes, the bureaucratization of procedures and work practices not only challenged the legitimacy of pit sense, but also cast pit sense and formalized procedures into an uneasy alliance.
摘要：This paper offers a new perspective on international management by examining the role of culture and management development in creating international expertise, a sense of identity and realizing organizational control. A critical analysis of the culture transmission and management development philosophy and practice of a UK-based transnational reveals how the transmission of culture accomplishes management development objectives, while management development itself serves as a vehicle for the transmission of the desired corporate values. This recursiveness is sustained by a corporate ideology that urges the creation of integrative values and, in turn, is legitimized by the quest for favorable functional and symbolic consequences.
摘要：This paper demonstrates how the art form jazz improvisation can be applied to organizational innovative activities, focusing specifically on product innovation. In the past, the literature on product innovation focused on well-planned approaches which followed a clearly-understood structure based on a rational-functionalist paradigm. However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this model is inappropriate in today's highly competitive business environment. A balance between structure and flexibility seems to be an appropriate way to manage the contradicting demands of control and creativity faced by organizations in highly competitive environments. Jazz improvisation provides this synthesis through the concept of `minimal structures'. We characterize the minimal structures that allow jazz improvisers to merge composition and performance, and then proceed to apply this approach to new product development.
摘要：This paper posits the concept of "appropriation" to explain the underlying ethos and rationale for seeking to secure the contribution of people to organizational functioning. Human resource management (HRM) practice is therefore largely underpinned by the objective of appropriating the human resource "value." This is ignored by the practitioner-oriented literature which has a financial interest in helping organizations to secure this value, and by the academic literature which is unwilling to confront the contradictions and uncomfortable truths inherent in such activities. The traditional approach to appropriation is characterized by such concerns as skill-formation, commitment to the organization, shared corporate values, and a reliance on formally constituted governance structures with a putative integrative ethos. This paper advocates a reconstitution of the appropriation regime to incorporate the concepts of knowledge and learning. We draw from the innovation management literature to highlight the problematic nature of appropriation and to clarify the implications of appropriation to the management of the knowledge that resides in people. Finally, we suggest how future research might proceed within an Appropriation-Learning (A-L) perspective.
摘要：In the fast-changing and globally competitive business environment, organizations』 efforts to appropriate knowledge from their workers will be increasingly resisted by those employees forced into more fragmented and uncertain careers. We interpret this contested scenario in terms of the apparently diametrically opposed ways in which knowledge is conceptualized. The organization sees knowledge as an asset which it seeks to appropriate through mechanisms designed to achieve employment flexibility . However, this process is not unidirectional, as we posit that the individual conceives of their knowledge as 『career capital』 and, in building it up as a response to the uncertainties of reconstituted careers, pursues a strategy of employability . With reference to Foucault’s genealogical approach, we argue that the above contest not only reflects the shifting employment relationship and economic turbulence, but is in fact a social phenomenon rooted in the knowledge−power dialectic and one which sheds light on individuals』 efforts to free themselves from the effects of normalization, thus challenging organizational efforts to appropriate the knowledge inherent in careers.
摘要：This article draws from Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology to examine how organizational spirituality is being framed as a new way to manage people. The article takes a critical look at the way much of the literature prescribes spiritual values with the subtext that human resource practices infused with spiritual values, inter alia, improve organizational performance. This article demonstrates how 『symbolic violence』 provides an analytical tool to unravel the theoretical make-up of organizational spirituality. This critique posits that the 『top-down』 approach to organizational spirituality relies on a Bourdieusian 『cultural arbitrary』 and the 『power of pedagogy』 to seek the active consent of organizational members. The article proceeds to identify the ideological underpinnings of this process, thus paving the way for new critical theorizing on organizational spirituality.
摘要：Knowledge appropriation has been underpinned by an assumption of the organization’s 『entitlement』 to appropriate knowledge and the outcomes of its utilization. Given the complexity of knowledge and the potentially conflicting views held about it, this assumption is revealed to be theoretically imprecise in the way it marginalizes alternative voices through the pursuit of competitive advantage and 『value capture』. We attribute this approach to the functionalist analytical lens which sees knowledge as an asset appropriable almost exclusively by the organization in the form of financial/economic 『rents』. In order to advance understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the organization-individual appropriation regime, we make the case for an expansion of the discursive space for talking about the phenomenon, and posit the concept of 『property in knowledge』 which we tie to the way individuals construct their identities.
摘要：The purpose of this study is to examine the character of any market response to the appointment of outside directors. The main propositions tested are: whether the stock market responds unconditionally to these appointments or whether the market response is conditional on the degree of the agency problem faced by the firm and the affiliation of the appointees. The authors use a New Zealand sample of the appointments of outside directors during the period from July 1999 to June 2004. The unconditional market response is examined analysing the abnormal returns generated by the appointing companies during the three‐day announcement period. The influences of the agency problem and the affiliation of directors are tested by employing multiple regressions. The findings provide strong support for the second proposition; the market considers the degree of the agency problem faced by the firm and the affiliation of outside directors in responding to these appointments. The percentage of outside directors in the board emerged as the strongest governance mechanism which, together with firm size, posed a significant inverse influence on announcement period abnormal returns. A strong interaction effect between appointee status and the agency problem was not present. The mere appointment of outside directors may not please the firm's investors. Such appointments are more useful for companies with severe agency conflicts; even if such a conflict is present, the affiliations that these outside directors have with the executives and the operations of the appointing companies may need to be considered in determining the value of such appointments.
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to report on the study of the two acquisitions of Telecom Italia carried out by Olivetti and Pirelli in the last decade, to evaluate how changes in ownership structure and corporate governance affected minority protection. The paper presents an analysis of how Olivetti's and Pirelli's takeovers were achieved. Then the authors contrast the two operations with regards to extraction of private benefits and expropriation of minorities' wealth. Shows that, in the case of Telecom Italia, the implementation of pyramids is connected with the existence of large private benefits, and that the acquisitions resulted in the substantial expropriation of minority shareholders. The analysis is referred to a very unique case. While a lot can be learnt from this approach, generalisations are not trivial. The conclusion is that groups owning several listed companies deserve a special discipline, as many are the policy implications of their presence in financial markets. Proposes an ad hoc methodology to consider companies from the top to the bottom of the pyramid chain, and to put in a common framework the non‐simultaneous operations linked by a common strategic goal, namely an acquisition. Further, a set of governance lessons is provided.
摘要：The paper aims to examine the link between firm‐level large share price movements, firm‐specific company announcements and corporate governance. Stock market regulation in the UK requires firms to disclose new price‐sensitive information immediately via official news providers. The paper investigates whether large share price movements are accompanied by firm disclosure. It also investigates whether corporate governance attributes influence the degree of disclosure by firms. The disclosure measure is constructed by identifying the largest abnormal daily stock returns for sample firms, and then firm‐specific announcements in the three‐day window centred on the abnormal return day are searched. Corporate governance variables known to influence disclosure practice are then collected and tested to ascertain whether they influence disclosure for positive and negative (good and bad announcements) abnormal returns. Large share price movements are accompanied by an official share price movement in 45.2 per cent of cases. This rises to 62.9 per cent when new analyst or newspaper articles are included as potential drivers of the abnormal share price return. The higher the proportion of non‐executive directors and CEO/chair duality lead to a higher incidence of bad news disclosure, suggesting increased scrutiny works. The higher the level of CEO and board ownership the lower the level of disclosure. Finally, institutional ownership concentration appears to negatively influence the level of disclosure. Higher levels of corporate governance are shown to lead to better firm disclosure. At the same time, the authors find that in almost 40 per cent of large abnormal share price returns no information has come to the market to drive the share price. Thus, the paper has important messages for regulators, who need to investigate why prices often move a long way without accompanying news. Shareholders, particularly institutions, should ensure high levels of disclosure by company directors.
摘要：This paper considers the impact of U.K. practices with respect to the measurement and disclosure of intangible assets, focusing on R&D activities. We first update prior U.K. work relating R&D activities to market prices. Second, given the clearly identified role of disclosure outside of the financial statements in helping market participants value R&D expenditures, we consider whether market forces are generally sufficient to ensure adequate disclosures with respect to intangibles by considering the cases of two biotechnology firms involved in the issuance of misleading disclosures. Within this context, we consider how disclosure regulation and enforcement mechanisms have evolved in recent years, and how this evolution has likely been affected by our 『scandal』 cases. Our conclusions are that the case of the U.K. does not give rise to any wide-scale concerns about the economic ill-effects caused by the current state of recognition and disclosure with respect to expenditures on intangibles. Further, market forces are unlikely to be sufficient in ensuring honest and timely disclosures with respect to intangibles, but the combination of official regulation and voluntary self-regulation appears to have stemmed the tide of any such disclosure scandals in the U.K.
摘要：We investigate the relation between perceived competition and voluntary disclosure in the absence of capital market incentives by examining private UK companies, which have the option to withhold sales and costs of sales information from their publicly-filed accounts. We survey managers about their companies' competitive environments and we calculate archival measures of industry competition. We find that managers are more likely to withhold information about sales and costs if they perceive that current or potential competition is strong. Consistent with disclosure being costlier for successful firms, we also find that more profitable companies are more likely to withhold information. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.